Accounting in Partnerships
By Steven Huddart and Pierre Jinghong Liang * In 1914, an accounting professor named Arthur Andersen founded a public accounting practice that became the world's largest professional-services firm. For years preceding the Enron debacle and Andersen's collapse, the firm had struggled to create incentives within the organization for partners to provide high-quality service, develop and sell new services, and meet the compensation expectations of various factions of partners. A years-long dispute over the division of profits between the firm's consulting and accounting arms led to the 1998 separation of the consulting practice from the audit and tax practices. The rise, break-up and fall of Andersen underlines the importance of questions concerning incentive structures within public accounting firms in particular, and partnerships of professionals in general. This paper offers a perspective on partner compensation schemes and the accounting information systems that support them.
In partnerships, ownership and control lie with the partners. Furthermore, each member of a partnership is endowed with human capital that may be employed either within the firm or without. Every partner is simultaneously a principal (who shares in the net output of the partnership) and an agent (who produces output). Ownership and control are diffused among many persons, and partners are subject to moral hazard: Each * Huddart: Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, Box 1912 , University Park, PA 16802-1912 huddart@psu.edu); Liang: Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 (e-mail: liangj@andrew.cmu.edu). We thank Thomas Hemmer for helpful discussions. must be motivated by his peers.
It is intuitive that the structure of professional partnerships is a function of the production and monitoring technologies available to the partners. As Oliver Williamson (1975, 43) Within Andersen Worldwide, for example, the profit sharing formula was designed to level partner compensation across units of the firm. When moral hazard is suspect, sharing invites undersupply of effort. Two avenues are open to reduce shirking. First, the size of the partnership can be reduced: the opportunity to free ride decreases in the number of partners in the firm, but opportunities to exploit synergies are forgone. Monitoring and associated incentive contracts are another way to combat shirking.
What factors determine the size and composition of partnerships? Our analysis focuses on one particular omnipresent size synergy, namely improved risk sharing. We consider sharing rules that are linear in the observable contracting variables under three information regimes. In the first-best case, perfect information about each partner's effort is contractible. Next, we consider the case where only firm output is contractible. In the final case, we assume that an accounting system provides noisy signals of partners' efforts.
In each case, the tension between the risk-sharing synergy and moral hazard determines firm size.
I. The Model
Let N = {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n } denote the set of individuals in a partnership. Each of the n partners exerts effort to produce output. The partners then divide the output among themselves. Each individual i is endowed with human capital and preferences Define a partnership sharing rule for a set of individuals, N , as (α, β, γ, p) where α is an n × n matrix whose ijth element is the piece rate applicable to signal s i in determining partner j's draw, β is an n-vector whose ith element is partner i's share of the output of the firm, p is an n-vector whose ith element is the productive effort exerted by partner i, and, γ is an n-vector whose ith element is a side payment to partner i.
The rule specifies how the members of N divide the output. The parties to the contract are the partners. Because individuals have constant absolute risk aversion and all random variables are normally distributed, it is convenient to express payoffs in terms of certainty equivalents. In certainty equivalent terms, partner i receives
At the start of the game, the members of N commit to a contract (α, β, γ). Signals and outcomes are observed after effort has been chosen. Partners can commit to make payments according to the agreement, but moral hazard exists for production effort, p i .
Once a particular sharing rule is adopted, each partner acts selfishly to maximize his utility given the stated sharing rule. Pareto optimal sharing rules maximize the sum of the certainty equivalents of the partners, or the joint surplus. Because the consumption good is transferable, the problem of maximizing output separates from the problem of distributing the surplus among the partners. That is, the transfers γ distribute the joint surplus among the partners, but do not affect the amount of surplus.
The partnership agreement must satisfy four constraints:
(a) Incentive Compatibility: Given the sharing rule, each partner weakly prefers to obey his production instructions to any other course of action.
(b) Budget Balancing: The sum of the side payments is zero, and partners bear all the risks and benefits of the technology they control. Holding aside constraint (c), the problem is to maximize the joint surplus among
where where p −i denotes all the elements of p except the ith. A partnership N is indefectible if no proper subset of N strictly prefers to leave the partnership to divide their surplus among themselves rather than share it with members of the larger set.
II. First-best
In the first-best case, perfect signals s i = p i of every individual's effort are available.
The joint surplus is maximized by setting partner i's draw at
where R(N ) = ( i∈N 1/r i ) −1 is familiar from Robert Wilson's (1968) analysis of syndicates. This implies β i = R(N )/r i . Every partner's stake in the output of the firm is proportional to his risk tolerance, so the allocation of risk across the partners is efficient.
The scheme also provides each partner with compensation, at the margin, equal to his marginal product. As in Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz's (1991) analysis of moral hazard in nonmarket institutions, the first best effort level, p 
III. Only Aggregate Output Is Observable
Consider now the case in which no signals of individual effort are available. If the only observable is aggregate output, x, then the costs imposed by free riding grow as the number of partners increases. Without an accounting system, risk sharing cannot be separated from the provision of incentives, which leads to inefficiency.
Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin (1985) analyze law partnerships as mechanisms that facilitate risk sharing among human capitalists. They identify shirking and "grabbing and leaving" as dysfunctional behaviors that sharing rules must overcome. Grabbing and leaving (i.e., the demand made by a partner for a larger share of profits accompanied by a threat to leave the firm) is quite similar to the indefectibilty constraint. In our setting, no general comment seems possible on the indefectibility or optimal size of an arbitrary partnership. When aggregate output is the only observable, all players are identical (i.e.,
, and the technology is low risk (i.e., krσ 2 < 2), then: (i) the joint surplus of a firm is 1/k−rσ 2 /2−1/(2kn); (ii) there is an upper bound on the number of partners in an indefectible firm, 3/(2−krσ 2 ), and (iii) there is an optimal number of partners in a firm, one of the two whole numbers closest to 2/(2−krσ 2 ). The largest indefectible partnership is not necessarily the optimal partnership size. For instance, in the case (k, σ 2 , r) = (1, 3/2, 1), the joint surpluses for partnerships of size 1 through 7 are, respectively, −0.2500, 0.0000, 0.0833, 0.1250, 0.1500, 0.1667, and 0.1786. Partnerships of size six and less are indefectible.
When the number of potential partners is large in relation to the optimal firm size, the joint surplus over n people is greatest when (almost) all individuals are members of partnerships of size four. In an industry like auditing of publicly-listed companies where the firms are very large in relation to the number of potential partners, partnership size may be driven more by indefectibility considerations than by considerations of optimal firm size.
Even with no hidden action, hidden information or risk aversion, splitting profit equally can limit the optimal size of partnerships. Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer (1988) analyze a coalition-formation game in which potential partners with diverse abilities choose to form partnerships to exploit a size synergy. As partnership size increases, the basic tradeoff is between gains from the size synergy and reductions in the income of the most productive partners (given equal sharing) as less productive partners are added to the partnership. In our analysis, the most able individuals have a low-risk technology (σ 2 i is small), a high risk tolerance, (r is small), and high level of talent (k i is small).
Less able partners have riskier technologies, higher risk-aversion, and lower talent levels.
There are greater returns to the firm to motivating (with a higher ownership stake) a talented partner than an untalented one. Also, it is less costly to motivate a partner who is risk tolerant or who operates a low-risk technology. On the other hand, the surplus that must be allocated to such a partner to keep him from defecting must be higher.
One might suppose a partnership between able individuals would be indefectible while less able individuals would enjoy higher surplus from forming separate sole proprietorships than from forming a partnership, but this is not true in general. For instance, suppose t 1 = (k 1 , σ 1 , r) and t 2 = (k 2 , σ 2 , r). Then comparison on the surpluses from a partnership and two sole proprietorships imply that a two-person partnership is indefectible if and
That is, the more able the individuals, the less attractive partnership becomes.
IV. Accounting Information
Assume now that an exogenously-specified accounting information system provides a vector of signals s where s i is informative only of effort by partner i. One feature of the accounting information in partnerships deserves special mention. In the usual agency setting with a risk-neutral principal, the principal serves as the "sink" who costlessly bears the risk associated with any risky signal-contingent compensation. In partnerships, in contrast, imposing a risky incentive contract on one partner entails distributing the risk associated with that payment schedule across the other risk-averse partners of the firm.
The risk imposed by signal-contingent contracts can be reduced either by making the signal more precise or by reducing the change in the payment associated with a change in the signal. Because s i says nothing about the effort of partner j for j = i, risk sharing alone dictates the choice of α ji for j = i. Therefore,
Since the partners can always choose α = 0, the accounting system can only help the partners to capture size synergies, so the size of indefectible partnerships is larger here than in the case where only aggregate output is observable. The first order conditions on the incentive compatibility constraints imply that p * i = (α ii + β i )/k i . Making this substitution and taking the first-order condition on the joint surplus with respect to the weight attached to a signal in the corresponding partner i's compensation yields
. It remains to maximize the joint surplus over β given p * and α * , and subject to j∈N β j = 1.
It follows that the characteristics of the accounting system determine the marginal share of each partner in the firm's output since the accounting information complements partners' stakes in firm output in inducing effort. The optimal choice of contract parameters α and β requires four factors to be balanced: (i) the output attributable to the signal-contingent compensation, (ii) the risk imposed on the partner who is monitored, (iii) the risk imposed on the partners who serve as the sink, and (iv) each partner's cost of production. As φ 2 i becomes small, the signal s i is more precise. In the limit as φ Measuring professional effort is difficult because judgements about quality are necessary and because effort is multi-faceted, including such elements as staff development, rain-making, and civic involvement. Producing and interpreting soft information about such effort so that it is made hard and contractible is critical to the formation of large partnerships. Likely, this measurement process is best accomplished by experts in the same professional field. In turn, this suggests that the accounting information system be designed and operated by the partners themselves.
V. Conclusions
While the analysis in the preceding sections presumes the accounting information system is exogenous, the considerations in this section suggest that its design is an endogenous choice of the partners. Eugene Kandel and Edward Lazear's (1992) conclusion that mutual monitoring and peer pressure can affect effort but are likely to be effective only when profits are shared by a very small group. To the extent the benefits of operating the accounting system are a public good whose cost is privately incurred, there can be shirking in the supply of this monitoring effort in partnerships of size three or more. This to monitor more intensely (and may produce more surplus) than when the role of sink is distributed across partners in proportion to their risk tolerances. These issues are explored in Huddart and Liang (2002) .
